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Introduction 
The recent paper by J and M Cuthbert continues the 
arguments they made earlier in the Commentary that errors 
in the application of Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
led to water customers being “overcharged”. Moreover, 
whilst the “implementation of the new control regime was 
meant to be neutral, the amount of borrowing available to 
the water industry under the new regime was clearly very 
restrictive compared to the borrowing limits applied to the 
industry” (Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2003; 2006). 
 
The paper repeats their view that the miscalculation of 
infrastructure renewal expenditure, depreciation costs and 
interest cover ratio, led to a restriction on borrowing for 
capital expenditure within the budgetary provision set by 
the Executive. 
 
In their original paper, they argued that there was a funding 
shortfall between the borrowing limits set by the Water 
Industry Commissioner (WIC) and the budgetary provision 
set out in his Commissioning Letter by the Minister for the 
Environment and Rural Development (Finnie, 2001), which 
arose from accounting errors over depreciation costs, as 
infrastructure renewals expenditure was counted twice, as 
part of “investment” and as part of “depreciation”. They 
also query the inclusion of a depreciation element within 
this framework, which “on the basis of the Treasury advice, 
should have been in AME”. These are erroneous 
assumptions.  Firstly, infrastructure renewals expenditure 
was part of the Capital Programme, and a cash charge. 
Depreciation refers to “non-cash annual depreciation costs” 
and is a distinctive element of setting the RAB resource 
allocation in resource terms within the capital DEL, with 
profits scoring on the Executive’s resource DEL.  Secondly, 
the arrangement whereby departments could score these 
non-cash costs in AME under Stage 1 of the 
implementation of RAB, did not apply to public 
corporations who scored within the DEL (HM Treasury 
2000). There was no overlap, no-double counting, and 
their paper contains misunderstandings of the operation of 
the budgetary control system in practice. 
 
Resource accounting in practice 
This can be demonstrated by setting out the system in 
detail. Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) seeks to 
promote 
 
• “a clearer view of the real costs of providing individual 
services, which takes account of the full costs of 
holding assets; 
 
• a more accurate figure for the cost of depreciation in 
government; 
 
• a more transparent split of capital and current 
spending with public corporations’ investment 
presented more clearly; 
 
• a better measure of the total value of central 
government assets”. 
 
(HM Treasury 2000, para.4) 
 
From its introduction in Spending Review 2000, RAB has 
differentiated between departments and public 
corporations, allowing big  non-cash cost items such as 
depreciation to be introduced in Annually Managed 
Expenditure (AME) for departments, whilst it scored public 
corporations in the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) 
for profits and capital investment. The “current” DEL was 
renamed the “resource” DEL to distinguish current 
consumption from investment in the “capital” DEL. 
 
In 2001-2 and 2002-3 RAB was implemented with capital 
charges excluded from the DEL until 2003-4. The initial 
resource basis was provided by departments and non- 
departmental public bodies (NDPBs) themselves. The 
exception to this was the treatment of public corporations 
such as Scottish Water, and the non-cash costs scored 
from it were correctly charged to the Executive’s Resource 
DEL, not AME. In 2002-3, the Scottish Water capital 
budget was fixed at £314m in resource terms, or £277m in 
cash terms, in the Executive’s DEL. 
 
At that time, the financial controls on Scottish Water itself 
were set by the Minister with advice from the WIC. The 
water industry has two sources of finance, revenue from 
customer charges and borrowing from government, both of 
which are regulated through a revenue cap and a 
borrowing limit, to fund the creation of new assets in the 
capital programme. Therefore, the industry’s revenue 
income funds operational costs, maintenance costs, 
infrastructure renewal costs which maintain its asset base, 
and interest payments arising from borrowing.  In 2001 it 
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was further required to generate a minimum 6 per cent rate 
of return as profits which can be used to fund the capital 
programme.  Borrowing is used to fund the creation of new 
assets, but not all new assets need be funded in this way, 
and can be funded from revenue.  At the time of the 
Strategic Review of Charges in 2001, the Water Industry 
Commissioner’s  recommended regulatory caps for 2002-6 
reflected his view of the scope for efficiency gains, and a 
prudent level of borrowing which – though allocated in the 
Executive’s capital budget – is borrowed from it and repaid 
in interest charges from the revenue from charges. 
 
 
The capital programme over the period was costed by 
Scottish Water at £2.3 billion, but the WIC assumed it 
could be delivered for £1.8 billion, through efficiency gains, 
and recommended a maximum borrowing limit of £514 
million.  The Executive approved a budgetary provision of 
£714 million, to provide a “buffer” in case the efficiency 
gains were not delivered, and this figure was in line with 
the broad assumption made by the Minister that the capital 
programme was split two-thirds/one-third between 
infrastructure renewal expenditure and new investment 
adding to the industry’s asset base. 
 
The Cuthberts’ mistake in this instance was in assuming 
that the WIC’s figure was in fact a rigid limit, whereas in 
practice it was advice to the Minister.  Within this 
framework, the Executive set the public expenditure limit 
on borrowing by Scottish Water, with the WIC’s advice. 
The gap between the WIC’s recommended borrowing limit 
of £514 million and the Executive’s budget provision of 
£714 million, reflects this exercise of political judgement by 
the Minister. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that there was no “double-counting” 
through the introduction of RAB to the Executive’s capital 
DEL, as no “non-cash charges” were made on its resource 
budget. This was confirmed in the Treasury’s letter to the 
Cuthberts referred to in their article (p.37), which stated 
that Infrastructure Renewals Expenditure is not in the 
Executive’s Resource Budget therefore there is no need to 
increase revenues twice through the charges to customers. 
Infrastructure renewal expenditure is treated as capital, and 
funded through borrowing and revenues from operating 
activities. 
 
The authors’ response is to say they agree that this is not 
double-counted in the Executive’s Resource DEL – but 
their concern is with double-counting in what they term the 
RAB Control Limit. This is not an official term, but clearly 
the source of the authors’ misunderstanding of the issue. 
Whilst Scottish Water has adopted an accruals accounting 
approach, this is not within the Treasury’s control regime, 
and therefore the Cuthberts’ assertion that the non-cash 
basis required under RAB should have been set against 
AME was simply wrong.  It was correctly dealt with in the 
Executive’s resource budget, whilst infrastructure revenue 
expenditure in Scottish Water’s capital programme was 
treated as a cash cost and funded by both income from 
charges and borrowing, with the borrowing element funded 
in the Executive’s resource budget in 2002-3. 
 
 
The next mistake is the assumption that the Executive’s 
financial control over Scottish Water was through a 
“combined limit”. The Commissioning Letter of 2001 simply 
states that the Executive’s limit is on borrowing of £314 
million plus profits. This is not a combined figure, as the 
controls on each element are separate and can be varied, 
eg  through supplementary borrowing consents or 
increased profits. 
 
The Cuthberts have confused the application of accruals 
accounting within Scottish Water with resource accounting 
and budgeting within government. If there was any double- 
counting within Scottish Water’s accounts, that surely 
would have been picked up by their auditors. The 
Treasury’s letter states 
 
 
 
“Scottish Water has adopted a renewals accounting 
approach to its infrastructure asset as a means of 
estimating depreciation.  This means that the amount of 
annualised planned expenditure to maintain the operating 
capacity of the infrastructure (i.e. maintenance costs) is 
treated as the depreciation charge for the period, reflected 
in the income and expenditure account.  It is the current 
charges on the income and expenditure account that 
should be met through current revenues, i.e. the level of 
charging must cover these operating costs. The actual 
infrastructure renewals expenditure for the year is treated 
as capital and funded, as is the capital programme, through 
borrowing from Scottish Ministers and cash generated from 
operating activities” 
 
(HM Treasury, 29/4/2005) 
 
 
 
In 2002-3, this was precisely what happened. Depreciation 
costs were contained in Scottish Water’s revenue 
spending, and the infrastructure renewal expenditure in its 
capital programme. The authors’ assumption that 
spending on infrastructure renewal expenditure was part of 
depreciation was mistaken, as it was a cash item of 
expenditure in the capital budget. The non-cash costs 
required under RAB were “scored” as intimated earlier in 
the Executive’s Capital DEL.  The Treasury’s comments 
that “the Scottish Executive is controlled on the basis of 
two entirely separate budgets and expected to manage 
them within a clearly defined framework, therefore in terms 
of control, there is no double-counting” (Scottish Parliament 
Finance Committee, 2004, 2nd Report, para.108).  In short, 
the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
was implemented in accordance with Treasury rules for 
2002-3.  In the following year, Scottish Water was taken 
out of the RAB framework and accounted for only in terms 
of its borrowing consent. 
QUARTERLY ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
  
 
 
Budgetary control since 2003 
In Spending Review 2000, a Public Expenditure Limit of 
£940 million was set, reflecting Executive uncertainty over 
“the operating environment and performance of the water 
authorities” at that time (Scottish Parliament Finance 
Committee, 2004, para.93). As we have seen, the WIC’s 
recommendations fell well within these totals, but the 
Executive retained a degree of unallocated provision to 
ensure that any failure to meet efficiency gains could be 
accommodated by further lending within the public 
expenditure limit, and without putting up charges and 
revising the revenue cap. In 2003-4, the budget provision 
was revised to cash control, and reduced to £678 million to 
take account of outturn expenditure in 2002-3, when only 
£51 million of the £277 million borrowing provision was 
utilised.  This gave Scottish Water borrowing consents of 
£610 million, with £78 million retained as unallocated 
provision. 
 
Therefore, the difference between the WIC’s figures and 
the Executive’s expenditure limits was not the result of 
accounting errors but different judgements by different 
actors  with different responsibilities. Their argument that 
this reflected a pessimistic view of the public finance 
available by the WIC in their 2003 paper is misplaced.  The 
Executive created the gap to deal with uncertainty in a 
period of organisational upheaval in the water industry. 
 
So too, therefore, is their judgement in their 2006 paper 
that differences in accounting for depreciation 
 
 
“- might explain the puzzling aspect of water finance over 
the period concerned: namely that the Scottish Executive 
was able to transfer significant amounts out of the funds 
allocated for Scottish Water in its budget …..” 
 
(Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2006, page 40). 
 
In fact, the reason for the transfers is more straightforward, 
in the sense of the long established pattern of 
underspending of capital programmes which was 
enhanced in the period from 2000 because of the major 
increases in funding available added to the problems of 
managing projects timeously (Midwinter, 2004).  As a 
result, underspending of the water budget is not a post- 
RAB problem.  It was significant in 2000-1 and 2001-2, and 
this allowed £148 million to be transferred to other 
programmes, and £205 million in 2003-4 (Scottish 
Executive Explanatory Note on End-Year Flexibility 2003- 
4). In 2003-4, this arose because Scottish Water drew 
down only £42 million of the £249.7 million available, 
because of programme slippage (£72 million), lower 
operating and interest costs (£45 million), and deferral of 
payments (£60 million) until 2004-5. 
 
As a result, Scottish Water agreed to the transfer to allow 
the funding to be used for other spending which the 
Executive brought forward, on the understanding that 
Scottish Water can have access to it under the EYF facility 
if needed in future. In the past two years, its 
underspending has fallen to £18 million and £9 million 
respectively, not, as the Cuthberts argue (p.36) is the 
amount of borrowing “very restricted compared with the 
borrowing limits previously applied to the industry”. In 
2001-2, the budget was £256.3 million; in 2003-4 it was 
£249.7 million - a minor difference. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The argument made in two papers by J and M Cuthbert that 
flaws in the introduction of Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting led to overcharging of water customers is wrong. 
 
In practice, Resource Accounting and Budgeting was 
implemented correctly through the application of non-cash 
costs to the Executive’s capital budget in 2002-3, as 
agreed with HM Treasury, and removed from the Water 
Budget in 2003-4, when it reverted to cash control. 
 
Moreover, the budgetary decisions reflected Executive 
policy that charges should be sufficient to cover the annual 
costs of the industry – operational costs, depreciation and 
interest charges – and new borrowing used to enhance the 
asset value of Scottish Water. 
 
The differences in borrowing limits between the WIC’s 
advice and the Executive’s expenditure provision reflected 
the Executive’s decision in 2002 to provide a significant 
level of unallocated funding in reserve to deal with 
uncertainty, particularly over efficiency gains. 
 
The Executive never intended this to be used to restrain 
water charges as the Cuthberts infer this buffer could have 
been used to achieve. Indeed, this would have been 
inconsistent with Treasury policy of only borrowing to invest 
in new assets, not replace existing ones. Indeed, 
increasing borrowing to keep charges down now simply 
adds to the long-term costs, and passes them on to 
consumers in the future. Borrowing to invest is defensible 
where future customers receive benefits from that 
investment, but not to reduce the cost of current 
consumption. 
 
The reallocation of provision for Scottish Water arose from 
a number of financial and management factors in project 
management, not differences in accounting practice 
between the WIC and the Executive. 
 
The reality is that over the past five years, public 
expenditure limits have not constrained Scottish Water’s 
capital programme nor pushed up its charges. The WIC 
was required to advise the Minister on a sustainable level 
of borrowing and of levels of charges which would allow 
Scottish Water to meet its daily running costs. Scottish 
Water spent well below those limits in the period 2001 to 
2004. In its Annual Report for 2005-6, it reports having 
reduced operating costs by around £150 million per 
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annum, and delivered around £1.5 billion of the £1.8 
billion capital programme (Scottish Water 2006). 
 
In conclusion, the Scottish Executive’s implementation of 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting in the case of the 
water services budget was not “flawed”, but consistent 
with Treasury Guidance.  In the real world, budgetary 
decision- making requires a flexible control framework to 
allow Ministers to respond to emerging pressures and 
problems. In this case, the Executive’s decisions were 
consistent with the policy principles set out by the 
Treasury, that borrowing should fund new assets, and not 
be used to keep down current charges at the expense of 
consumers in the future, whilst revenues cover the cost of 
current consumption. There were no accounting errors in 
the process. 
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